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Abstract  
 
Functioning in our everyday lives requires that humans rely on organizing and categorizing our 
world. This ability to categorize rests on object individuation, the ability to track the identity of 
objects when they leave and reenter sight. Objects can be individuated using three types of 
information: spatiotemporal, object property and object kind. Surprisingly, noun comprehension 
may affect infants’ use of object kind information (Xu 1999; Xu 2002). However, research using 
a comparative approach suggests that the ability to use kind information to aid in object 
individuation may not be unique to humans: great apes, rhesus monkeys and dogs all 
successfully individuate objects using spatiotemporal and property/kind information (Brauer & 
Call 2011; Phillips & Santos 2005; Uller 1997). Little is known about non-linguistic animals’ 
ability to individuate objects using kind information alone. Here we explore the effect of a 
language cue on dogs’ ability to use kind information for object individuation. We recruited 24 
dogs to participate in a violation of expectation paradigm and subsequently analyzed mean 
looking times in expected versus unexpected outcomes. Results did not support our predictions: 
dogs looked equally long at expected and unexpected outcomes for all individuation cues. 
However, our methodology may have lacked appropriate controls, thus future research into this 
topic is warranted.  
 
Keywords: object individuation, perception, dogs, Canis familiaris, spatiotemporal information, 
object property, object kind  
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This or that?: Object individuation in domesticated dogs (Canis familiaris) 
Adult humans encounter a variety of objects throughout the day. For example, one may 
encounter two very different objects, such as a truck and a toy duck. Our perceptual and 
cognitive mechanisms allow us to recognize and individuate these as discrete objects: to 
recognize that the truck and the duck are different from each other and are not the same type of 
object. This ability to categorize objects as distinct allows us to make inferences about the way 
an object may act or how we may act upon objects. A truck is useful for moving around places or 
transporting objects, while a toy duck is useful for entertaining a child or storytelling. While the 
origins of this object individuation are still being determined, we do know that adult humans use 
at least three sources of information in order to individuate objects: spatiotemporal, object 
property, and object kind information (Xu, 1999).  
Spatiotemporal information involves the generalizations we make about an object’s 
location in space and its path through time (Xu, 1999).  For example, one object cannot be in two 
places at the same time, nor can two objects occupy the same space at the same time. Imagine 
you see a red truck drive down the street in front of you and it turns right at an intersection. If 
immediately after the truck is out of sight you see an identical red truck drive past you from the 
opposite side of the intersection you would not infer that it was the same truck; you would 
necessarily infer that there are two identical but discrete trucks as their paths did not cross or 
align spatially. 
Object property information includes the use of featural elements of an object, such as its 
color, size, and shape to aid in object individuation. The way that human adults use object 
property depends on our knowledge of category. Thus, information about the kinds of objects 
things are can inform our criteria for object individuation using object property information.  
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Object kind information refers to the knowledge we have about specific categories that 
objects belong to. Our knowledge about specific categories also allows us to make inferences 
about what featural properties of an object require our attention in that category. For example, a 
red truck cannot also be a blue truck without being painted. Imagine you see a red Toyota truck 
in your neighbor’s driveway all the time and one day the truck in the driveway changes to a blue 
Honda truck. You know that your neighbor must have purchased a new truck. However, now 
imagine you have a real pet duckling living in your house. She is yellow all over and weighs less 
than a pound. Now you leave your house and your roommates to take care of your duckling for a 
few weeks. You come back and your duckling has grown in size and is now yellow and grey. 
You know it is the same duckling you left because real ducks molt their feathers and change 
colors during their development. Thus, similar changes in the properties (color, shape) of your 
neighbor’s truck and your pet duckling lead you to infer two different things about the identity of 
the objects.  
It is still largely unknown what kinds of cognitive and perceptual mechanisms facilitate 
adult humans to use the relevant information provided in each type of cue. Things like color 
perception and binocular vision aid in our perception of the informative cues aforementioned 
while attention and memory allow us to store this knowledge. However, little is known about the 
cognitive mechanisms required for object individuation using kind information alone. While the 
use of the informative cues outlined above is well understood in adult humans, it is still unclear 
when during development children start to understand these cues, and what promotes the 
development of this ability (Xu, 1995).   
 Recent research has shown that infants as young as 4 - 10 months old readily use 
spatiotemporal information to aid in object individuation, but it’s not until 12 months of age that 
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they use object property and object kind information (Rivera and Zawaydeh, 2006; Xu, 1996; 
Xu, 1999, Xu & Baker, 2005; Xu, Carey and Quint, 2004; Xu, 2007; Xu, Cote, and Baker, 
2007). To come to this conclusion, researchers have used looking time measures to assess infants 
‘surprise’ when three informative cues—spatiotemporal, object property, and object kind—were 
violated. For example, to test 10 and 12 month old infants’ ability to use spatiotemporal 
information in object individuation, researchers measured the looking time of infants who saw a 
toy duck removed from each of two occluders and then appear to move magically between them. 
The infants did not directly observe the movement, rather they only saw the unexpected outcome 
of just one toy duck behind an occluder. This violated the spatiotemporal continuous path, as the 
occluders were separated by about a foot, and the toy duck did not pass through the open space 
between them. Infants looked significantly longer at this outcome compared to a control 
condition in which the duck did not move between the occluders (Figure 1). Similarly, to test the 
infants’ ability to use object property information, researchers measured the looking time of 
infants who first saw a toy duck removed from behind an occluder and then replaced behind the 
occluder. Infants then saw a toy truck removed from behind the same occluder, replaced, and 
finally, researchers removed the occluder to reveal only a toy duck, but no toy truck, behind it. 
Infants looked significantly longer at this outcome compared to a control condition in which both 
the duck and truck remained behind the occluder (Figure 2).  
Ten month old infants successfully individuated the toy duck —i.e. looked longer at the 
outcome in which spatiotemporal information was violated—when spatiotemporal information 
was provided, but failed when only object property information was provided—i.e. looked 
equally as long at outcomes where property information was violated or maintained. However, 
12 month old infants were able to successfully individuate the objects in both conditions (Xu, 
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1996; Xu, 1999). These findings suggest that 12 month old infants understand how to use object 
property information whereas 10 month old infants do not. Because no spatiotemporal 
information was provided in the second example, when objects remained behind a single 
occluder, successful object individuation required the use of object property information alone. It 
is possible that 10-month old infants did not share the same expectation violation as 12 month 
old infants because the 10 month old infants rely exclusively on spatiotemporal information for 
object individuation. Thus, 12 month old infants’ expectations were violated when the physical 
properties of the toy changed behind the occluder without evidence of an actual change in the toy 
by the experimenter while 10 month old infants were unable to detect this change.  
 The change in infants’ ability to use object property and object kind information seems to 
occur relatively rapidly over the course of two months. However, there is a correlation between 
the acquisition of infants’ ability to individuate objects using property/kind information alone 
and their burgeoning language development. This correlation suggests an important role of 
language development in infants’ ability to use kind information for object individuation 
(Balaban & Waxman 1996; Xu 1999; Xu 2002; Xu, Cote, & Baker 2007). Interestingly, noun 
comprehension may have an effect on this developmental difference. In her original study, Xu 
(1999) used preliminary data from parental reports of noun comprehension to show that 10 
month old infants who did not know any or knew just one of the words for the items in the 
individuation task (neither truck nor duck or only one of the two) failed at using object 
property/kind information whereas those that knew two or more words succeed in the task 
(similar to 12 month old children, 85% of which understood 2 or more of the words). This 
suggests that having words for objects may help infants individuate kind categories in their 
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environment and allow them to use kind membership for object individuation in property/kind 
tasks.  
Further studies have also suggested the importance of language on kind categorization 
and object individuation. These studies demonstrate that nine month old infants succeed in object 
property/kind individuation when given two distinct labels for items, but do not succeed when 
the same label is used for both objects or when tones, sound, or emotional expressions are used 
as labels (Balaban & Waxman 1996; Xu, 2002; Xu, Cote, & Baker 2007). For example, only 
when given the distinct cues, “Look, it’s a truck. Look it’s a duck” are 9 month old infants able 
to successfully individuate a toy truck from a toy duck in the absence of spatiotemporal 
information. Conversely, when given cues like:  “Look it’s a toy. Look it’s a toy.”, two distinct 
tones—a D sharp note and a C note one octave higher—or two distinct emotional expressions— 
“Ah!” or “Ewy!”—nine month infants fail to individuate objects (Xu, 2002). Xu (2002) 
hypothesized that language may play a role in infants’ acquisition of object kind concepts and 
that words, whether known or unknown, may serve as “essence placeholders” which convey 
simple information about objects for individuation, but do not yet represent a complete object 
kind concept.   
The role of language in human representations of object kind concepts is still relatively 
unknown. In order to tease apart object kind concepts from object property concepts embedded 
in them, superficial or non-necessary properties of an object can be manipulated while 
maintaining the kind distinction of the object (Mendes, Rakoczy & Call, 2007). For example, ten 
year old children understand that if a raccoon is shaved and painted like a skunk it still remains a 
raccoon even though its physical properties now resemble those of a skunk rather than a raccoon 
(Keil, 1989). Thus, a language cue can be used as a superficial and non-necessary property of an 
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object to provide cues about its kind category without physically changing the object’s 
properties. In other words, if the same toy duck is labeled as both “Blicket” and “Dax” as it 
arises from behind an occluder then we might predict that human infants would expect to see two 
toy ducks behind the occluder when it drops, one representative of the cue “Blicket” and one 
representative of the cue “Dax”.  
If language is important for human infants’ development of the ability to use kind 
information to individuate objects, then it is reasonable to expect that non-human animals 
without language may be unable to use kind information alone to individuate objects. However, 
research with other species has demonstrated that use of object property/kind information for 
object individuation is not uniquely human (Brauer & Call 2011; Mendes, Rakoczy & Call, 
2007; Phillips & Santos 2005; Santos, Sulkowski, Spaepen & Hauser, 2002; Uler, Carey, Hauser 
& Xu, 1997). Three great ape species, rhesus monkeys, and cotton top tamarins successfully used 
spatiotemporal and object property information to individuate objects (Brauer & Call 2011; 
Medes, Rakoczy & Call, 2007; Santos, Sulkowski, Spaepen & Hauser, 2002; Uller, Carey, 
Hauser & Xu, 1997; Xu 2007). For example, in the spatiotemporal case researchers showed the 
monkeys that one squash and one carrot piece went into a box together and were not removed. 
Monkeys were allowed to search the box and should have expected to find one piece of each 
food. In the object property case researchers showed the monkeys one carrot piece (orange, long 
and cylindrical) going into the box and then one squash piece (yellow, curved and flat) going 
into the box. The monkeys then expected to find one carrot piece and one squash piece because 
they seemed to understand that a carrot cannot turn into a squash, and thus there must be two 
physically different objects in the box that match what was originally put in individually by the 
experimenters (Uller, Carey, Hauser & Xu, 1997). Rhesus monkeys were able to successfully 
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individuate a piece of carrot from a piece of squash—that is they searched longer in the box 
when there were two pieces of the same food rather than one piece of each food—using 
spatiotemporal information when the carrot and squash where shown going into a box at the 
same time, and object property information when the carrot and squash where shown going into 
the box separately (Uller, Carey, Hauser & Xu, 1997).  
These studies provide evidence that non-linguistic species can successfully individuate 
objects using object property information. However, little is known about their representation of 
object kind concepts. It is unclear whether the monkeys were using object property information 
of carrots and squash (i.e. the carrot piece was bright orange, straight, 22 centimeters long and 3 
centimeters in diameter while the squash piece was bright yellow, curved and 20 centimeters 
long) or if they were using kind information such that they have a cognitive representation of 
carrot pieces versus squash pieces, possibly based on previous experience with the taste, 
appearance, and use of each object (Uler, Carey, Hauser & Xu, 1997). To explore this, Phillips 
and Santos (2005) showed that rhesus monkeys successfully individuate different kinds of 
objects even when their properties are held constant, suggesting that non-human primates do 
possess kind representations. As nonhuman primates do not have linguistic labels for squash and 
carrots this suggests that linguistic labels are not required for kind representations; however, it is 
still unclear how non-human animals represent kind distinctions and whether this representation 
is similar to our own (Phillips & Santos, 2005).  
In order to better assess the mechanisms, and the development of these mechanisms, that 
aid in object individuation by humans and non-human animals, it may be helpful to study object 
individuation in a subject species that shares some features of language acquisition like the 
infants, but is not completely linguistic.  Domesticated dogs, Canis lupis familiaris, may provide 
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an effective way to investigate how non-human animals represent kind distinctions and how it 
relates to our own ability. Through the process of domestication, dogs have developed the unique 
ability to learn associative values for words quickly by virtue of their relationship with humans. 
This sensitivity to words can allow us to use non-meaningful language cues to portray 
categorical or kind information about an object to dogs while retaining the same property 
information. Using this language cue will help elucidate the differences or similarities between 
dogs’ and humans’ representations of kind distinctions when tasked with object individuation.   
Importantly, domesticated dogs have been shown to possess the ability to “fast map” 
words (Kaminski, Call & Fischer, 2004). Fast mapping is the ability children develop during 
speech acquisition to form quick and rough hypotheses about the meaning of new words only 
after a single exposure. For example, a child who has never seen gloves before, but has 
experience with and knows the words for scarf, hat and coat is probably able to still retrieve 
gloves from a pile of winter outerwear when asked for gloves by a parent: gloves are the 
outerwear that they do not already have a name for. Dogs seem to possess cognitive mechanisms 
to do the same kind of fast mapping as human children (Kaminski, Call & Fischer, 2004). For 
example, a dog named Rico when asked to retrieve a novel item from a pile of toys he already 
had labels for was able to link the novel label with the novel item. If Rico knew which toys were 
“Rabbit,” “Raccoon,” “Duck” and “Squirrel,” but not “Moose”, he was able to infer which object 
was “Moose” by exclusion: it was the label that goes with the toy that is not labeled “Rabbit”, 
“Raccoon”, “Duck”, or “Squirrel”. He could then bring the novel “Moose” to his owner. Rico 
may have known which toy to fetch because he excluded all of the other toys he already had 
labels for, similar to fast mapping in human children. Additionally, Rico was able to store the 
new knowledge about the name identity of toy because he was able to successfully retrieve the 
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target toy from a set of both novel and familiar items four weeks later (Kaminski, Call & Fischer, 
2004).  
In an object individuation study by Brauer and Call (2011), dogs showed similar behavior 
patterns and performed similarly to great apes when using spatiotemporal and object property 
information. For example, during individuation tests, both dogs and apes remained closer to an 
experimenter and begged more often in trials with unexpected outcomes than trials with expected 
outcomes. Unexpected outcomes are when the rules regarding informative cues being tested—
spatiotemporal and object property—are not followed (i.e. a less desired food item magically 
took the place of a more desired food item without the subject seeing the change). Both dogs and 
apes also reacted similarly to positive food surprises (i.e. good food object had been substituted 
for bad food object) and negative food surprises (i.e. bad food object substituted for good food 
object) (Brauer & Call, 2011). The similarities in behavior and responses between great apes and 
dogs suggest that object individuation, based on spatiotemporal and object property information, 
may be a basic skill possessed by many mammal, or even animal, species.   
Pet dogs also experience similar environments to human infants and share, in some ways, 
a similar baseline exposure to language from their owners as infants from their parents. Dogs are 
often exposed to the same kind of praise, tone and type of speech that infants are. However, dogs 
lack the ability to develop human language and manipulate language in the same way that 
humans do (Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch, 2002). It is possible that the exposure infants experience 
during development promotes their development of object individuation using kind information. 
Thus, domesticated dogs provide an excellent study species to explore the effect of language 
cues and language acquisition on object kind individuation when object property information is 
held constant.   
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We aim to replicate the results of Brauer and Call (2011), using a modified looking time 
task to show that pet dogs do possess the ability to individuate objects using spatiotemporal and 
object property information. Additionally, we predict that when property information is held 
constant and a unique language cue (label) is given, dog’s will be able to use object kind 
information alone, portrayed by the language cue, to successfully individuate objects. This 
experimental procedure demonstrates an expected event which, if dogs understand the relevant 
cues, should be in line with their perceptual and cognitive expectations (resulting from feature 
detection, short term memory, etc.) and an unexpected event which, if dogs understand the 
relevant cues, should violate the informational cues being tested (spatiotemporal, object property, 
and object kind). Infants and non-human animals usually look longer at unexpected events 
compared to expected events suggesting that they detect the violation and are surprised by the 
outcome. 
  We are employing a looking time version of this study because preliminary research 
into this topic through pilot testing dogs showed that dogs were at ceiling when allowed to search 
and interact with food items that they were individuating in testing trials. In other words, dogs 
spent the entire time allotted searching inside the box in each outcome resulting in an inability to 
determine whether they were surprised in violation conditions compared to expected. Similarly, 
because we ultimately aim to test dogs’ ability to individuate when property information is held 
constant and only kind information is provided by a unique language cue, we required a method 
that allowed property information to be held constant. If dogs were able to interact with a food 
item as the dependent variable they may have picked up on property information like smell and 
texture which would interfere with their use of the language cue.  
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I predict that when object property information is held constant and object kind 
information is manipulated by the presence of a distinct language cue, dogs will successfully 
individuate objects. For example, when the same toy is labeled with two different cues I predict 
dogs will expect to see two of the same toy, one for each label, behind an occluder rather than 
only one toy. This prediction is supported by findings from Brauer and Call (2011) and Phillips 
and Santos’s (2005). Assuming that dogs will respond to an object individuation task similarly to 
primates, as suggested by Brauer and Call (2011), dogs should be able to use object kind 
information alone to individuate objects as the rhesus macaques portrayed this ability in Phillips 
and Santos’s (2005). The prediction is also supported by infants’ ability to use object kind 
information later in development after some language acquisition, as pet dogs and infants share 
similar exposure to language input in their environments (Balaban & Waxman 1996; Xu 2002, 
Xu, Cote & Baker, 2007).  
Method 
Subjects 
 24 domestic dogs (Canis lupis familiaris; thirteen females and 11 males, age range 5 
months-12 years, M = 6.50, SD = 3.70) were recruited from the Illinois Wesleyan University Dog 
Scientist database (Appendix A). Nine dogs were excluded because the experimenter could not get 
their attention (5), their owner interfered (1), they were too anxious to participate (1), their owner 
disclosed impaired eyesight after testing (1), or they barked during all looking periods making it 
impossible to code looking (1). Nine dogs were excluded from just one condition (one 
spatiotemporal, four property, three kind with language, and one kind without language) because 
the experimenter could not get their attention, but these dogs participated in the other three 
conditions.  
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Materials  
The looking time (LT) apparatus was constructed out of foam core and measured 23 cm 
wide X 51.5 cm long  X 47 cm tall (Figure 3). The apparatus consisted of a stage in front of an all-
white background, 51.5 cm long x 33 cm tall, with two sides, 23 cm long x 47 cm tall and an 
attached retractable occluder, 51.5 cm long x 47 cm tall, to cover the stage during presentations of 
the stimuli. The stage had a false bottom which opened into an area under the stage to store the 
stimuli, 23 cm wide X 51.5 cm long X 14 cm tall. During testing trials toys were retrieved from 
the false bottom by removing the base of the stage and extending a hand into the storage 
compartment. They were then placed on the stage resulting in the desired outcome.  
The stimuli used for presentation were a Fischer Price tote-along monsters baby toy model 
Harvey and a Bright Stars twiddle tweets toy. Sony HD video recording HDR-CX430  Handycam  
camcorder was used to record each trial. The camera was positioned directly to the right of the 
looking time apparatus facing the subject dog directly. The author and another undergraduate 
student analyzed videos of each dog in the lab to using MPEG Streamclip software and Microsoft 
Excel to determine mean looking times for the two outcomes for each dog in each condition. 
Reliability between these two coders was good (α = 0.84).  
Procedure 
Dogs arrived at the Illinois Wesleyan Dog Scientists lab and were allowed time to 
acclimate to the lab and testing room while their owners spoke with the research assistants and 
signed a consent form. Each dog participated in eight trials during the study. There were four 
conditions each with two outcomes (expected and unexpected) resulting in 8 trials per dog: 
spatiotemporal (2), object property (2), object kind with language (2), and object kind without 
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language (2). The order of conditions and outcomes within conditions was counterbalanced across 
subjects.  
Spatiotemporal  
Dogs were brought into the testing room by experimenter 1 (E1). E1 restrained dogs in 
either a sit, stand or lay position approximately 2 meters and 40 centimeters away from the LT 
apparatus and facing the LT apparatus directly. Experimenter 2 (E2) knelt behind the LT apparatus 
with the occluder covering the stage and all stimuli in the false bottom compartment of the stage.  
The two outcomes, expected and unexpected, were visually different and required 
familiarization trials to ensure that the dogs were not preferentially looking at one outcome in the 
testing trials. Dogs were familiarized with the possible outcomes before any informative cues were 
given about the objects. First, in the familiarization, E2 showed the dog two of the same Harvey 
model of toy on the stage (unexpected outcome), and then one of each Harvey and Twiddle Tweets 
model of toy on the stage together (expected outcome). Each familiarization lasted 10 seconds 
(Figure 4). E2 then cleared the stage and dropped the occluder, cueing the dog to look at the empty 
stage by saying “Dog’s name, look”. E2 left the empty stage displayed for 5 seconds before 
retracting the occluder (Figure 5). For the unexpected outcome E2 removed one Harvey and one 
Twiddle Tweets model from the false bottom and showed the subject both toys simultaneously by 
extending her arms in front of her and over the top of the LT apparatus (Figure 6). E2 again cued 
the dog by saying “Dog’s name, look” and displayed the toys for 5 seconds. E2 then repeated this 
display a second time. After the second display E2 placed the toys inside the LT apparatus and 
surreptitiously replaced the Twiddle Tweets toy with a copy of the Harvey toy so that two of the 
same Harvey toy were left on the stage at the end of the trial. E2 then dropped the occluder, averted 
her gaze, and allowed the dog to look for 10 seconds. This outcome was unexpected because it 
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violated the information portrayed in the presentation such that a Harvey toy now appeared on the 
stage rather than a Twiddle Tweets toy without any cue given to the dog about the movement of 
either toy. Thus, if dogs are tracking spatiotemporal information it would appear that the second 
Harvey toy magically moved onto the stage and the Twiddle Tweets toy magically disappeared 
from the stage. The expected condition was exactly the same except E2 replaced the Twiddle 
Tweets toy with an exact copy of itself to ensure that the movements of E2’s hands were consistent 
across conditions. If dogs are tracking spatiotemporal information this outcome would be expected 
as it matched the presentation and toys the dogs saw in the presentation.  
Object Property  
The object property condition was identical to the spatiotemporal trial except that during 
the display the toys were shown one at a time as opposed to simultaneously (Figure 6). By showing 
toys one at a time this removed any spatiotemporal information present in the previous condition 
and forced the dogs to rely on only the featural properties of the toys to aid in individuation. During 
the display period E2 first removed the Harvey toy model and cued the dog. Then E2 put the 
Harvey model back into the LT apparatus and removed the Twiddle Tweets model and cued the 
dog. In the unexpected outcome E2 surreptitiously exchanged the Harvey toy for the Twiddle 
Tweets toy and dropped the occluder so that two Twiddle Tweets toys remained on the stage. The 
expected condition was the same except that the Harvey toy was exchanged for an exact copy of 
itself and one Harvey and one Twiddle Tweets toy model remained on the stage when E2 dropped 
the occluder.  
Object Kind  
The familiarization sessions for the object kind trials were one Harvey model toy on the 
stage and two Harvey model toys on the stage together (Figure 4). The object kind trial began the 
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same as the other two trials with the display of an empty stage. In this trial only the Harvey model 
of the toy was used to control for property information and the Harvey toys were shown only one 
at a time to control for spatiotemporal information. Thus, the object kind condition required dogs 
to rely solely on kind information provided by a language cue. In the test condition E2 removed 
one Harvey model, cued the dog by saying, “Dog’s name, look. It’s a dax” and placed the toy back 
on the stage. Then E2 removed the same Harvey model toy from the LT apparatus and cued the 
dog by saying, “Dog’s name, look, it’s a blicket” and placed the toy back on the stage (Figure 7). 
In the unexpected condition E2 left just one toy Harvey model on the stage and dropped the 
occluder and allowed the dog to look for 10 seconds. In the expected condition, E2 surreptitiously 
put another of the same Harvey model toy, from the false bottom, on to the LT stage and dropped 
the occluder. The control condition was exactly the same as the test condition with both unexpected 
and expected outcomes, except that there was no language cue given during the display and E2 
only cued the dog’s attention by saying, “Dog’s name, look.”  
Results 
 We performed paired samples t-test to compare mean duration of looking in each 
outcome (expected or unexpected) in each condition (spatiotemporal, property, kind with 
language, and kind without language). We found no statistically significant differences between 
mean looking times in the two outcomes of any condition (Figure 8): spatiotemporal expected 
outcome (M = 2.60, SD = 2.06) and spatiotemporal unexpected outcome (M = 2.22, SD = 2.28); 
t(22) = -0.74, p = 0.47; property expected outcome (M = 2.38, SD = 2.30) and property 
unexpected outcome (M = 2.75, SD = 3.04); t(18) = 0.53, p = 0.60; kind with language expected 
outcome (M = 1.66, SD = 2.28) and kind with language unexpected outcome (M = 1.64, SD = 
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1.32); t(20) = -0.05, p = 0.96; kind without language expected outcome (M = 2.13, SD = 2.26) 
and kind without language unexpected outcome (M = 2.42, SD = 2.29); t(21) = 0.72, p = 0.48.  
In an effort to reduce the variation in a post hoc analysis we averaged the looking times 
in unexpected (M = 2.11, SD = 1.56) and expected outcomes (M = 2.40, SD = 1.93)  for the 
spatiotemporal, property and kind with language conditions. This analysis still failed to reach 
any significance t(17) = -1.219, p = 0.240.  
 
Discussion 
 Here we aimed to first replicate the results of Brauer and Call (2011) to show that dogs 
possess the ability to use spatiotemporal and property information in object individuation and 
second, to expand this line research by investigating dogs’ ability to use kind information alone, 
provided by a language cue, to individuate objects. We predicted that dogs would be able to 
individuate objects (i.e. look longer at unexpected outcomes) using spatiotemporal and property 
information as was found by Brauer and Call (2011), and that dogs would be able to individuate 
objects using kind information provided by a unique language cue when property information 
was held constant. We predicted that dogs would look significantly longer at the unexpected 
outcomes in the spatiotemporal, property, and kind with language conditions but that there would 
be no difference in looking time between the outcomes in the kind without language condition.  
 Our results did not support these predictions. Dogs did not look significantly longer at 
either outcome in any of the conditions. Data was collected within subjects, so a preference in 
looking at either outcome was controlled. In other words, every subject participated in every 
condition and saw every outcome. This way each dog’s individual preference in looking at the 
apparatus was represented in both the expected and unexpected outcomes to ensure any 
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difference in looking was due to the outcome itself rather than differences in dogs represented in 
the sample. It is important to note that there was high variation in looking times for all conditions 
and all outcomes. Notably, the sample size in this study was small for looking time studies (24 
dogs and not all dogs’ looking time data could be used for every condition), however, in an effort 
to reduce the variation in a post hoc analysis we averaged the looking times in unexpected and 
expected outcomes for the spatiotemporal, property and kind with language conditions. This 
analysis still failed to reach any significance, suggesting that additional subjects in the sample 
may not have changed the results.  
 Our findings in the spatiotemporal and property trials directly conflict with the findings 
by Brauer and Call (2011). While the methodology employed by Brauer and Call (2011) is 
slightly different than our own—they used a “magic” cup featuring food items as the objects 
requiring individuation and also allowed dogs to interact with the cup after viewing the 
demonstration—we still expected to see similar effects in the use of these informative cues by 
dogs. It is possible that these methodological differences may have made the Brauer and Call 
(2011) study more motivating for dogs, thus tapping into their actual ability to use these cues 
more effectively.  
 While Brauer and Call (2011) may be the only current evaluation of dogs’ ability to use 
spatiotemporal and property information in object individuation, other studies have successfully 
used the same violation of expectation method employed in our study to investigate the use of 
other perceptual mechanisms in dogs (Erdőhegyi, Gergely & Topál,  2009; Pattison, Miller, 
Rayburn-Reeves & Zentall, 2010; Pattison, Laude, & Zentall, 2013). The past success using this 
type of method indicates that the violation of expectation paradigm is able to detect perceptual 
and cognitive abilities in dogs. Importantly, the Brauer and Call (2011) results supporting 
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spatiotemporal and property/kind object individuation in dogs suggests that dogs do possess this 
capacity despite our study’s inability to detect it. One explanation for this disparity is that our 
methodology varied slightly from those aforementioned which were successful in detecting 
subjects’ surprise during violation trials. There is some evidence in developmental literature that 
behavioral dependent measures may result in different outcomes compared to looking time 
dependent measures (Diamond, 2001). 
This difference in experimental outcomes on behavioral tasks compared to looking time 
measures present themselves in research involving the “A not B error”. In the “A not B error” 
behavioral studies infants habituate reaching into location “A” to retrieve a toy and then observe 
the toy being move to location “B” but fail to reach for the toy in location “B” (Diamond, 2001). 
Interestingly, when looking time is used as the dependent measure in this topic of interest, 
infants do not show the same preference for looking at location “A”. Diamond (2001) describes 
this difference in part due to the different cognitive processes that occur preceding goal oriented 
actions. These processes involved looking, planning, reaching and remembering (Diamond, 
2001). Thus, it may be that differences in dependent measures can tap into different parts of the 
preceding cognitive process and present different experimental findings. While this finding 
predicts successful looking and unsuccessful behavioral responses from human children, it is 
unknown how this phenomenon would present itself in nonhuman animals. Thus, leaving open 
the possibility of an inverse effect in dogs such that they would be successful in behavioral 
measure, but unsuccessful in looking time measures.  
 Another methodological difference between the present study and other successful 
looking time studies involved the number of familiarization trials and outcome presentations. 
Our study featured two familiarization trials, one for each outcome, and only one testing trial of 
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each outcome, expected or unexpected (Erdőhegyi, Gergely & Topál,  2009; Pattison, Miller, 
Rayburn-Reeves & Zentall, 2010; Pattison, Laude, & Zentall, 2013). This experimental design 
allowed us to test all four conditions (spatiotemporal, property, kind with language, kind without 
language) within subjects to control for individual differences in looking preferences. However, 
this design also meant that we had to minimize familiarization trials and outcome presentations 
to retain subjects’ attention, potentially compromising the sensitivity of the method. Minimizing 
trials may have compromised the sensitivity of this methodology because more trials would have 
made the violation, or unexpected outcomes, more salient in the subjects’ mind and our study 
lacked this added salience. This design contrasts with other looking time studies which had more 
success than our own (Erdőhegyi, Gergely & Topál,  2009; Pattison, Miller, Rayburn-Reeves & 
Zentall, 2010; Pattison, Laude, & Zentall, 2013). The study by Brauer and Call (2011), which 
measured different behavioral responses to a habituation and dishabituation paradigm, employed 
fourteen baseline (expected) trials and two surprise (unexpected/violation) trials. This study 
design allows the subjects to habituate to the expected or baseline trials, thus enhancing the 
surprise and potentially increasing their duration of looking in unexpected outcomes.  
 Similarly, other studies employing the violation of expectation or habituation and 
dishabituation paradigms to study other perceptual abilities in dogs have had success using 
multiple expected trials, habituation to the expected outcome or shaping before the unexpected 
trials (Erdőhegyi, Gergely & Topál,  2009; Pattison, Miller, Rayburn-Reeves & Zentall, 2010; 
Pattison, Laude, & Zentall, 2013). Pattison, Miller, Rayburn-Reeves, and Zentall (2010) 
investigated dogs’ understanding of the physical properties and memory of objects by measuring 
looking time in a violation of expectation paradigm. Their procedure involved four habituation 
periods used to familiarize the dogs to their apparatus and the movement of the apparatus. These 
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trials were followed by two more habituation trials to familiarize dogs with the objects they used 
in their study (Pattison, Miller, Rayburn-Reeves, and Zentall, 2010). After the habituation trials 
the dogs participated in six testing trials (Pattison, Miller, Rayburn-Reeves, and Zentall, 2010). 
The use of multiple habituation and testing trials may have helped the dogs pick up on the 
changes between an expected and unexpected outcomes. Finally, their experimental set up 
featured opaque cloths on either side of their apparatus and a cloth for the experimenter to hide 
from the subject’s line of sight behind (Pattison, Miller, Rayburn-Reeves and Zentall, 2010). The 
use of this opaque covering removed any potential distractions from the subject’s vision, thus 
increasing the likelihood that they would spend time looking at the apparatus rather than around 
the surrounding areas. Therefore, our dogs could have been distracted to differing degrees. This 
could explain the large variation we saw in individual looking times (i.e. some dogs may have 
been distracted by the surrounding areas whereas other may not have been). Future studies may 
benefit from using an additional measure for auditory distractions during testing trials. 
Controlling statistically for distraction may help alleviate some of the individual difference seen 
in looking time. 
 Erdőhegyi, Gergely, and Topál (2009) employed similar methods to Pattison, Miller, 
Rayburn-Reeves and Zentall (2010) to investigate dogs’ concept of size constancy. Their method 
featured shaping trials in which dogs were shown the expected condition for six trials and then 
one unexpected trial (Erdőhegyi, Gergely & Topál, 2009). Looking times from the last shaping 
trial and the unexpected trial were compared to show significantly longer looking time in the 
unexpected outcome (Erdőhegyi, Gergely & Topál, 2009). It is possible that Brauer and Call 
(2011), Pattison, Miller, Rayburn-Reeves and Zentall (2010), and Erdőhegyi, Gergely, and Topál 
(2009) may have all been more successful using a looking time paradigm because of these 
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methodological differences. Their success with this method and, most notably, Brauer and Call’s 
(2011) results regarding spatiotemporal and property/kind individuation in dogs suggest that the 
violation of expectation paradigm is effective for investigating dogs’ perceptual abilities. It also 
suggests that although our study did not find any indication of dogs’ capacity to use 
spatiotemporal, property, and kind information to individuate objects, these abilities may still be 
present in dogs’ repertoire of perceptual and cognitive skills.   
 The findings of this study suggest that the mechanisms by which humans individuate 
objects using property/kind information and language may still be unique. Our results show no 
evidence of dogs using language in ways similar to that of human infants, however, this study 
was methodologically flawed and careful interpretation of these results is required. The 
limitations present in this study should be avoided in future research of this topic which remains 
justifiable and of interest. Future studies may benefit from implementing additional 
familiarization, habituation or shaping trials into the experimental design. With the addition of 
these trials, future studies may also require a between subjects design as not to lose the attention 
of the subjects during multiple trials within each condition. With the addition of these 
experimental elements, it is possible that future endeavors into this topic will be more effective. 
Our study was limited by a small sample size, a lack of additional trials, and possible external 
distractors in our testing room. While we found no significant difference in subjects’ looking 
time between expected and unexpected outcomes, it is likely that this was due to our 
experimental limitations and future research should continue investigating the use of 
spatiotemporal, property, and kind information by dogs in object individuation tasks.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
 
Figure 1. Adapted from Xu & Carey (1996). An example of a display used to assess infants 
understanding of spatiotemporal information in object individuation. The unexpected condition 
violates spatiotemporal information as the object apparently passed through the space between 
the screens and thus informs infants that there must be two objects, one behind each screen.  
 
 
 
Screens introduced
Object 1 brought out
Object 1 returned 
Object 2 brought out
Object 2 returned 
Expected outcome
Unexpected outcome
Screens are removed to reveal either: 
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Figure 2. Adapted from Xu & Carey (1996). An example of a display used to assess infants 
understanding of property information in object individuation. The unexpected condition violates 
property information as the single object seems to magically transform properties to represent 
both a heart and a smiley face.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Screens introduced
Object 1 brought out
Object 1 returned 
Object 2 brought out
Object 2 returned 
Expected outcome
Unexpected outcome
Screens are removed to reveal either: 
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Figure 3. Looking time apparatus. A. Looking time apparatus with the occluder up. This is what 
dogs see when E2 prepares displays or is surreptitiously removing one of the baby toys. B. The 
apparatus with the occluder down. This is the stage display where toys sit that dogs see during 
each trial. C. Overhead view of false bottom in the stage with toys inside false bottom. This is 
where toys are stored during trials for removal or for the change of a toy type.  
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Figure 4. Familiarizations for each condition. B and C are familiarizations for spatiotemporal and 
property kind trials. B is the expected outcome and C is the unexpected outcomes. A and C are the 
familiarizations for the kind trial. C is the expected outcome and A is the unexpected outcome.  
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Figure 5. Stills taken from experimental procedure to demonstrate exactly what each subject sees 
in each condition. Kind without language not represented, however, is it the same procedure as 
kind with language except toys are not labeled “dax” or “blicket”, rather the dog is simple cued by 
the experiment saying “Dog’s name, look”. The expected and unexpected outcomes are reversed 
in the kind without language condition such that the expected outcome is one Harvey toy and the 
unexpected outcome is two Harvey toys to follow the most parsimonious explanation for the 
demonstration.  
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Figure 6. Each display type dogs will see during demonstrations. A. This display is used in the 
spatiotemporal trials for both the expected and unexpected conditions. The B display is used in the 
property and the kind conditions. The C display is used in the property condition. B and C are the 
displays used in the object property and kind trial for both the unexpected and expected. Order of 
which toy is shown first is counterbalanced, but they always appear on these respective sides.    
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Figure 7. Display for kind trial. E2 showed the same toy twice, but with different labels for it and 
say either one toy on the display stage in the unexpected condition (Figure 3A) or two toys in the 
expected conditioned (Figure 3C) 
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Figure 8. KindL denotes the kind with language condition and KindNL denotes the kind without 
language condition. Mean looking time, with standard deviations, for the expected and unexpected 
outcomes of each condition. There was no significant difference between the means of expected 
and unexpected outcomes for any condition.  
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Appendix A 
 
 
